Iranian National Sentenced to Four Years in Prison for Conspiracy to Illegally Export Prohibited Parts to Iran
08/15/11 12:22 PM
On
August 15, 2011, U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) announced that Davoud
Baniameri, 38, an Iranian national who
maintained a residence and business in
California was sentenced to 51 months in federal
prison after he pleaded guilty in May to one
count of conspiracy to export goods and
technology to Iran without a license from the
U.S. Department of Treasury in violation of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) and one count of attempting to export
defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List from
the United States without a license or approval
from the U.S. Department of State in violation
of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
Baniameri was arrested on a criminal complaint on Sept. 9, 2009, and indicted in December 2009. A superseding indictment in July 2010 charged Baniameri and his two co-defendants Syed Majid Mousavi (Mousavi) and Andro Telemi (Telemi).
According to the plea agreement, sometime before October 10, 2008, Mousavi, based in Iran, contacted Baniameri in California and requested that he purchase and export radio test sets from the United States to Iran, through Dubai. Baniameri agreed and over the next few months negotiated the purchase of three Marconi radio test sets from a company in Illinois. Baniameri arranged for the radio test kits to be sent to him in California, where he shipped them to Dubai, for ultimate transshipment to Iran, without the required export license.
The plea agreement also states that, sometime before August 10, 2009, Mousavi contacted Baniameri and requested that he purchase and export to Iran via Dubai 10 connector adapters for the TOW and TOW2 missile systems. Baniameri agreed to purchase the items on behalf of Mousavi, and over the next few months, he admitted that he and his co-defendants attempted to purchase 10 connector adaptors from a company in Illinois, which unbeknownst to them, was in fact a company controlled by law enforcement. In September 2009, Baniameri admitted that he directed Telemi to take possession of the connector adaptors in California after having paid $9,450 to a representative of the Illinois company. To further facilitate the export of these items to Iran, Baniameri arranged to fly from the United States to Dubai and then from Dubai to Iran. Baniameri did not attempt to obtain a license from the U.S. government for the export of the connector adaptors. He was arrested before leaving the United States.
Baniameri was arrested on a criminal complaint on Sept. 9, 2009, and indicted in December 2009. A superseding indictment in July 2010 charged Baniameri and his two co-defendants Syed Majid Mousavi (Mousavi) and Andro Telemi (Telemi).
According to the plea agreement, sometime before October 10, 2008, Mousavi, based in Iran, contacted Baniameri in California and requested that he purchase and export radio test sets from the United States to Iran, through Dubai. Baniameri agreed and over the next few months negotiated the purchase of three Marconi radio test sets from a company in Illinois. Baniameri arranged for the radio test kits to be sent to him in California, where he shipped them to Dubai, for ultimate transshipment to Iran, without the required export license.
The plea agreement also states that, sometime before August 10, 2009, Mousavi contacted Baniameri and requested that he purchase and export to Iran via Dubai 10 connector adapters for the TOW and TOW2 missile systems. Baniameri agreed to purchase the items on behalf of Mousavi, and over the next few months, he admitted that he and his co-defendants attempted to purchase 10 connector adaptors from a company in Illinois, which unbeknownst to them, was in fact a company controlled by law enforcement. In September 2009, Baniameri admitted that he directed Telemi to take possession of the connector adaptors in California after having paid $9,450 to a representative of the Illinois company. To further facilitate the export of these items to Iran, Baniameri arranged to fly from the United States to Dubai and then from Dubai to Iran. Baniameri did not attempt to obtain a license from the U.S. government for the export of the connector adaptors. He was arrested before leaving the United States.
Individuals Indicted for Conspiracy to Export Computer-related Equipment to Iran
04/21/11 01:40 PM
On
April 21, 2011, U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) reported that Jeng “Jay”
Shih, a U.S. citizen, and his Queens, N.Y.
company, Sunrise Technologies and Trading
Company, were indicted in the District of
Columbia on 27 counts relating to the illegal
export of computer-related equipment to Iran
without first having obtained the required
Department of Treasury license.
According to the indictment, Commerce Department agents visited Shih’s business in New York in 2006 where they informed Shih about U.S. laws governing the export of goods from the U.S. to other countries, particularly embargoed countries like Iran. In April 2010, ICE-Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents seized hundreds of laptop computers that originated from Sunrise and were destined for Dubai, UAE. Communications related to these shipments indicated that the purchasers were located in Iran.
The indictment further alleges that agents subsequently identified a company in Dubai that was purchasing millions of dollars of computers from U.S. companies for export to Iran, through Dubai. ICE-HIS agents arrested one of company’s agents, who pleaded guilty in December 2010 and began cooperating with the government. In interviews with agents, the agent indicated that he and his company in Dubai had purchased million worth of laptops from Shih in recent years for shipment to Iran. The agents determined that more than 1,000 computers had been shipped by Shih’s company to Dubai and later to Iran, between April 2010, and May 2010, alone.
In February 2011, the cooperating agent met with Shih in New York. In recorded conversations, Shih allegedly told the agent he was aware of the U.S. embargo against Iran and U.S. export control laws. According to the indictment, Shih also told the cooperating individual how to avoid detection when shipping goods to Iran by using fake invoices and indicated that he treated the seizure of some of his shipments as a “loss” when reporting business income and loses on his U.S. taxes.
If Shih is convicted, he will face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine for each of the IEEPA counts and five years for each false statement count, all related to this illegal exports case.
DOJ also reported that Massoud Habibion, 48, aka “Matt Habibion” or “Matt Habi, and Mohsen Motamedian, 43, aka “Max Motamedian” or “Max Ehsan,” both U.S. citizens, and their Costa Mesa, California, company, Online Micro LLC, were indicted in the District of Columbia on 32 counts relating to the illegal export of computer-related equipment to Iran without the required Department of Treasury license.
The indictment against Habibion and Motamedian alleges that a company in Dubai, referenced above in Shih’s case, purchased millions of dollars worth of laptop computers from Online Micro and that these computers were subsequently shipped to Iran. According to the affidavit, the cooperating agent for the Dubai company told federal agents that Habibion and Motamedian sold roughly $300,000 worth of computers to the Dubai company each month and that Habibion and Motamedian fully understood that the computers were destined for Iran.
In December 2010, the cooperating individual met with Habibion and Motamedian. Allegedly, they instructed the cooperating individual to make fake invoices to conceal that Iran was the destination of the shipments and to indicate that the end-users were in Dubai. In addition, the indictment alleges that in a Jan. 5, 2011, meeting, Habibion told the cooperating individual to lie to federal agents about conducting business in Iran, stating, “If they ask you, for instance, ‘Do you do business in Tehran?’ ‘No, I don't have any business in Tehran. I go there to visit my family, but I have no business there.’ They will ask such questions, it is part of their routine.”
If Habibion or Motamedian are convicted, they will face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine for each of the IEEPA counts and five years for each false statement count relating to this illegal exports case. In addition, they also face 20 years for each obstruction of justice count.
According to the indictment, Commerce Department agents visited Shih’s business in New York in 2006 where they informed Shih about U.S. laws governing the export of goods from the U.S. to other countries, particularly embargoed countries like Iran. In April 2010, ICE-Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents seized hundreds of laptop computers that originated from Sunrise and were destined for Dubai, UAE. Communications related to these shipments indicated that the purchasers were located in Iran.
The indictment further alleges that agents subsequently identified a company in Dubai that was purchasing millions of dollars of computers from U.S. companies for export to Iran, through Dubai. ICE-HIS agents arrested one of company’s agents, who pleaded guilty in December 2010 and began cooperating with the government. In interviews with agents, the agent indicated that he and his company in Dubai had purchased million worth of laptops from Shih in recent years for shipment to Iran. The agents determined that more than 1,000 computers had been shipped by Shih’s company to Dubai and later to Iran, between April 2010, and May 2010, alone.
In February 2011, the cooperating agent met with Shih in New York. In recorded conversations, Shih allegedly told the agent he was aware of the U.S. embargo against Iran and U.S. export control laws. According to the indictment, Shih also told the cooperating individual how to avoid detection when shipping goods to Iran by using fake invoices and indicated that he treated the seizure of some of his shipments as a “loss” when reporting business income and loses on his U.S. taxes.
If Shih is convicted, he will face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine for each of the IEEPA counts and five years for each false statement count, all related to this illegal exports case.
DOJ also reported that Massoud Habibion, 48, aka “Matt Habibion” or “Matt Habi, and Mohsen Motamedian, 43, aka “Max Motamedian” or “Max Ehsan,” both U.S. citizens, and their Costa Mesa, California, company, Online Micro LLC, were indicted in the District of Columbia on 32 counts relating to the illegal export of computer-related equipment to Iran without the required Department of Treasury license.
The indictment against Habibion and Motamedian alleges that a company in Dubai, referenced above in Shih’s case, purchased millions of dollars worth of laptop computers from Online Micro and that these computers were subsequently shipped to Iran. According to the affidavit, the cooperating agent for the Dubai company told federal agents that Habibion and Motamedian sold roughly $300,000 worth of computers to the Dubai company each month and that Habibion and Motamedian fully understood that the computers were destined for Iran.
In December 2010, the cooperating individual met with Habibion and Motamedian. Allegedly, they instructed the cooperating individual to make fake invoices to conceal that Iran was the destination of the shipments and to indicate that the end-users were in Dubai. In addition, the indictment alleges that in a Jan. 5, 2011, meeting, Habibion told the cooperating individual to lie to federal agents about conducting business in Iran, stating, “If they ask you, for instance, ‘Do you do business in Tehran?’ ‘No, I don't have any business in Tehran. I go there to visit my family, but I have no business there.’ They will ask such questions, it is part of their routine.”
If Habibion or Motamedian are convicted, they will face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine for each of the IEEPA counts and five years for each false statement count relating to this illegal exports case. In addition, they also face 20 years for each obstruction of justice count.
Iranian Man Charged with Illegally Exporting Specialized Metals
02/01/11 02:04 PM
On
February 1, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) issued a press release
reporting that
Milad Jafari, (Jafari), a 36-year old citizen
and resident of Iran, has been indicted for
conspiracy, smuggling and illegally exporting
specialized metals and other materials from the
U.S. through companies in Turkey to several
entities in Iran, including some that have been
sanctioned for involvement in ballistic missile
activities.
Specifically, the indictment alleges that from about February 2004 through about August 2007 Jafari engaged in conspiracy and exported goods to Iran in violation of the U.S. embargo and without the required U.S. government licenses. Jafari and his conspirators allegedly solicited orders from customers in Iran and purchased goods from U.S. companies on behalf of these Iranian customers. Jafari and others allegedly wired money to the U.S. companies as payment, concealed from the U.S. companies the end-use and end-users of the goods, and caused the goods to be shipped to Turkey and later to Iran.
Jafari and his associates are thought to operate a procurement network that provides direct support to Iran's missile program by securing metal products, including steel and aluminum alloys, for subordinates of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). On February 1, 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Jafari, his associates and several corporate entities in Iran and Turkey under Executive Order 13382, which targets for sanctions proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. This is expected to block Jafari and his associates from the U.S. financial and commercial systems.
The indictment seeks forfeiture of $177,868 in connection with these offenses. Jafari remains at large and is believed to be in Iran. He faces a maximum potential sentence of five years in prison for the conspiracy count, 20 years in prison for each count of illegal exports to Iran, and 10 years in prison for each smuggling count.
Specifically, the indictment alleges that from about February 2004 through about August 2007 Jafari engaged in conspiracy and exported goods to Iran in violation of the U.S. embargo and without the required U.S. government licenses. Jafari and his conspirators allegedly solicited orders from customers in Iran and purchased goods from U.S. companies on behalf of these Iranian customers. Jafari and others allegedly wired money to the U.S. companies as payment, concealed from the U.S. companies the end-use and end-users of the goods, and caused the goods to be shipped to Turkey and later to Iran.
Jafari and his associates are thought to operate a procurement network that provides direct support to Iran's missile program by securing metal products, including steel and aluminum alloys, for subordinates of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). On February 1, 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Jafari, his associates and several corporate entities in Iran and Turkey under Executive Order 13382, which targets for sanctions proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. This is expected to block Jafari and his associates from the U.S. financial and commercial systems.
The indictment seeks forfeiture of $177,868 in connection with these offenses. Jafari remains at large and is believed to be in Iran. He faces a maximum potential sentence of five years in prison for the conspiracy count, 20 years in prison for each count of illegal exports to Iran, and 10 years in prison for each smuggling count.
UK Firm Fined $2M for Exporting Boeing 747 Aircraft to Iran
05/11/10 12:10 PM
On May
11, 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
announced that Balli
Aviation Ltd., a subsidiary of the United
Kingdom-based Balli Group PLC, was sentenced
that day in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia to pay a $2 million fine
and to serve a five-year corporate period of
probation after pleading guilty on Feb. 5, 2010,
to a two-count criminal information in
connection with its illegal export of commercial
Boeing 747 aircraft from the United States to
Iran.
DOJ stated that:
The court imposed the maximum $2 million fine and a corporate probation of five years. The $2 million fine combined with a related $15 million civil settlement among Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation Ltd., the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), is one of the largest fines for an export violation in BIS history.
DOJ stated that:
According to count one of the criminal information filed with the court, beginning in at least October 2007, through July 2008, Balli Aviation Ltd. conspired to export three Boeing 747 aircraft from the United States to Iran without first having obtained the required export license from BIS or authorization from OFAC, in violation of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the Iranian Transactions Regulations. Specifically, the information states that Balli Aviation Ltd., through its subsidiaries, the Blue Sky Companies, purchased U.S.-origin aircraft with financing obtained from an Iranian airline and caused these aircraft to be exported to Iran without obtaining the required U.S. government licenses. Further, Balli Aviation Ltd. entered into lease arrangements that permitted the Iranian airline to use the U.S.-origin aircraft for flights in and out of Iran.Count two of the criminal information states that Balli Aviation Ltd. violated a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) issued by BIS on March 17, 2008, that prohibited the company from conducting any transaction involving any item subject to the EAR. Starting in or about March 2008 and continuing through about August 2008, Balli Aviation Ltd. willfully violated the TDO by carrying on negotiations with others concerning buying, receiving, using, selling and delivering U.S.-origin aircraft which went to the Export Administration Regulations.
The court imposed the maximum $2 million fine and a corporate probation of five years. The $2 million fine combined with a related $15 million civil settlement among Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation Ltd., the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), is one of the largest fines for an export violation in BIS history.
French Court Refuses U.S. Request to Extradite Iranian Engineer
05/05/10 09:44 AM
The
New York Times reported that on May 5,
2010, French court rejected a U.S. request to
extradite Majid Kakavand (Kakavand), an Iranian
engineer and businessman accused of buying
equipment for a front company in Malaysia and
then rerouting it to Iranian military firms, in
violation an American embargo on exports to
Iran.
Specifically, the indictment against Kakavand alleged that from January 2006 to December 2008 he purchased online dual-use equipment intended for military purposes and had it shipped to Iran via Malaysia. The equipment included capacitors, resistors, connectors, reflectometers and pressure sensors that have a military application.
Iran Electronics Industry, one of the Iranian companies Kakavand bought the equipment for, was put on the European Union blacklist in June 2008. The last transaction between him and the company took place in April 2008. The other company, Iran Communications Industry, manufactures military and civilian communication equipment and now too is on the European blacklist.
The French government prosecutor opposed the request to extradite Kakavand on the grounds that he had not violated French law and that equipment at issue was not necessarily military in nature. In addition, he emphasized that, in contrast to the U.S., neither France nor the European Union has a general trade embargo on Iran.
The court ordered Kakavand set free, and his passport and bail returned. The U.S. Justice Department spokesman said efforts to apprehend Kakavand would continue, and that he would stand trial for his alleged crimes if he came into U.S. custody.
Specifically, the indictment against Kakavand alleged that from January 2006 to December 2008 he purchased online dual-use equipment intended for military purposes and had it shipped to Iran via Malaysia. The equipment included capacitors, resistors, connectors, reflectometers and pressure sensors that have a military application.
Iran Electronics Industry, one of the Iranian companies Kakavand bought the equipment for, was put on the European Union blacklist in June 2008. The last transaction between him and the company took place in April 2008. The other company, Iran Communications Industry, manufactures military and civilian communication equipment and now too is on the European blacklist.
The French government prosecutor opposed the request to extradite Kakavand on the grounds that he had not violated French law and that equipment at issue was not necessarily military in nature. In addition, he emphasized that, in contrast to the U.S., neither France nor the European Union has a general trade embargo on Iran.
The court ordered Kakavand set free, and his passport and bail returned. The U.S. Justice Department spokesman said efforts to apprehend Kakavand would continue, and that he would stand trial for his alleged crimes if he came into U.S. custody.
Exporter Assessed $100,000 Penalty for Unauthorized Exports to Iran
04/02/10 11:18 PM
On
April 2, 2010, Aqua-Loop Cooling Towers Co.
(Aqua-Loop) of Folsom, CA, settled with Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) charges of violating
the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR).
According to the settlement agreement, from June 2004 to April 2005, Aqua-Loop exported items subject to the EAR from the U.S. to Iran, via the United Arab Emirates, without the required authorization from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Specifically, Aqua-Loop searched for and obtained items from U.S. distributors and then exported them to an Iranian customer and co-conspirator, Parto Abgardan Cooling Towers Co. (Parto). On one occasion, Parto asked Aqua-Loop to purchase a filament winding machine in the U.S. on its behalf and forward it on to Dubai and then to Iran.
According to the settlement agreement, Aqua-Loop was assessed a civil penalty of $100, 000 that was suspended for 10 years. The company is also prohibited from dealing in any transaction that is subject to the EAR for ten years
According to the settlement agreement, from June 2004 to April 2005, Aqua-Loop exported items subject to the EAR from the U.S. to Iran, via the United Arab Emirates, without the required authorization from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Specifically, Aqua-Loop searched for and obtained items from U.S. distributors and then exported them to an Iranian customer and co-conspirator, Parto Abgardan Cooling Towers Co. (Parto). On one occasion, Parto asked Aqua-Loop to purchase a filament winding machine in the U.S. on its behalf and forward it on to Dubai and then to Iran.
According to the settlement agreement, Aqua-Loop was assessed a civil penalty of $100, 000 that was suspended for 10 years. The company is also prohibited from dealing in any transaction that is subject to the EAR for ten years
U.S. Seeks Extradition of Iranian Engineer Who Purchased Sensitive Items Online
02/17/10 10:12 PM
The
Associated Press reported that on
February 17, 2010, a French court postponed a
decision on whether to extradite an Iranian
Engineer to the U.S., where he is accused of
exporting goods to an embargoed country, money
laundering, smuggling goods, and other charges.
Majid Kakavand (Kakavand) was arrested in Paris
on March 20, 2009 and held in prison until
August 26, 2009, until his release on condition
that he stays in Paris.
U.S. government claims that Kakavand went online to purchase U.S. electronics, including capacitors, inductors, resistors, sensors and connectors, and had them shipped to Malaysia, from where they were forwarded to two Iranian military entities.
The French court must decide whether Kakavand is to be extradited based on whether his actions were illegal in France as well as the United States. U.S. government claims that Kakavand needed export licenses to send the items to Iran. Kakavand’s attorneys argue that he did not violate French or European Union laws which have no general trade embargo on Iran like the U.S, and that documents in all sales transactions were stamped NLR, for “No License Required.”
The main argument in this case is whether items that Kakavand purchased have sensitive defense uses. The accused firefengineer contends that the electronics that he bought online are ordinary and commonplace; however, the U.S. in its extradition request argue that many items at issue meet military standards.
In February’s hearing, the judge handling the case asked for additional information on the matter, including France’s military armament body studies, before making the extradition decision. The new hearing has been set for March 31, 2010.
U.S. government claims that Kakavand went online to purchase U.S. electronics, including capacitors, inductors, resistors, sensors and connectors, and had them shipped to Malaysia, from where they were forwarded to two Iranian military entities.
The French court must decide whether Kakavand is to be extradited based on whether his actions were illegal in France as well as the United States. U.S. government claims that Kakavand needed export licenses to send the items to Iran. Kakavand’s attorneys argue that he did not violate French or European Union laws which have no general trade embargo on Iran like the U.S, and that documents in all sales transactions were stamped NLR, for “No License Required.”
The main argument in this case is whether items that Kakavand purchased have sensitive defense uses. The accused firefengineer contends that the electronics that he bought online are ordinary and commonplace; however, the U.S. in its extradition request argue that many items at issue meet military standards.
In February’s hearing, the judge handling the case asked for additional information on the matter, including France’s military armament body studies, before making the extradition decision. The new hearing has been set for March 31, 2010.
UK Firm Pleads Guilty to Exporting Boeing 747 Aircraft to Iran; Pays $15 Million in Fines
02/06/10 02:58 PM
On
February 5, 2010, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) announced that Balli
Aviation Ltd., a subsidiary of United
Kingdom-based Balli Group PLC, pleaded guilty in
the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to a two-count criminal information in
connection with its illegal export of commercial
Boeing 747 aircraft from the United States to
Iran. (BIS’ press release can be found
here.)
The DOJ announced:
Under the plea agreement, Balli Aviation Ltd. agreed to pay a $2 million criminal fine and be placed on corporate probation for five years. The $2 million fine, combined with a related $15 million civil settlement among Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation Ltd., the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), that was also announced today, represents one of the largest fines for an export violation in BIS history.
Under the terms of the related civil settlement, Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation Ltd. have agreed to pay a civil penalty of $15 million of which $2 million will be suspended if there are no further export control violations. In addition, Balli Aviation Ltd. and Balli Group PLC are denied export privileges for five years, although this penalty will be suspended provided that neither Balli Aviation nor Balli Group commits any export violations and pays the civil penalty. Under the terms of the settlement, Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation, Ltd. will also have to submit the results of an independent audit of its export compliance program to BIS and OFAC for each of the next five years.
According to count one of the information filed with the court, beginning in at least October 2005, through October 2008, Balli Aviation Ltd. conspired to export three Boeing 747 aircraft from the United States to Iran without first having obtained the required export license from BIS or authorization from OFAC, in violation of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the Iranian Transactions Regulations. More particularly, the information states that Balli Aviation Ltd., through its subsidiaries, the Blue Sky Companies, purchased U.S.-origin aircraft with financing obtained from an Iranian airline and caused these aircraft to be exported to Iran without obtaining the required U.S. government licenses. Further, Balli Aviation Ltd. entered into lease arrangements that permitted the Iranian airline to use the U.S.-origin aircraft for flights in and out of Iran.
Count two of the information states that Balli Aviation Ltd. violated a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) issued by BIS on March 17, 2008, that prohibited the company from conducting any transaction involving any item subject to the EAR. Starting in or about March 2008 and continuing through about August 2008, Balli Aviation Ltd. willfully violated the TDO by carrying on negotiations with others concerning buying, receiving, using, selling and delivering U.S.-origin aircraft which went to the Export Administration Regulations.
"Today's case should serve as further warning of Iran's continued efforts to circumvent sanctions and obtain U.S. technology. Together with our colleagues from the Justice and Commerce departments, OFAC will continue to aggressively pursue both domestic and foreign entities that seek to violate U.S. sanctions programs by exporting goods to Iran from the United States." said Adam J. Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.
The DOJ announced:
Under the plea agreement, Balli Aviation Ltd. agreed to pay a $2 million criminal fine and be placed on corporate probation for five years. The $2 million fine, combined with a related $15 million civil settlement among Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation Ltd., the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), that was also announced today, represents one of the largest fines for an export violation in BIS history.
Under the terms of the related civil settlement, Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation Ltd. have agreed to pay a civil penalty of $15 million of which $2 million will be suspended if there are no further export control violations. In addition, Balli Aviation Ltd. and Balli Group PLC are denied export privileges for five years, although this penalty will be suspended provided that neither Balli Aviation nor Balli Group commits any export violations and pays the civil penalty. Under the terms of the settlement, Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation, Ltd. will also have to submit the results of an independent audit of its export compliance program to BIS and OFAC for each of the next five years.
According to count one of the information filed with the court, beginning in at least October 2005, through October 2008, Balli Aviation Ltd. conspired to export three Boeing 747 aircraft from the United States to Iran without first having obtained the required export license from BIS or authorization from OFAC, in violation of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the Iranian Transactions Regulations. More particularly, the information states that Balli Aviation Ltd., through its subsidiaries, the Blue Sky Companies, purchased U.S.-origin aircraft with financing obtained from an Iranian airline and caused these aircraft to be exported to Iran without obtaining the required U.S. government licenses. Further, Balli Aviation Ltd. entered into lease arrangements that permitted the Iranian airline to use the U.S.-origin aircraft for flights in and out of Iran.
Count two of the information states that Balli Aviation Ltd. violated a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) issued by BIS on March 17, 2008, that prohibited the company from conducting any transaction involving any item subject to the EAR. Starting in or about March 2008 and continuing through about August 2008, Balli Aviation Ltd. willfully violated the TDO by carrying on negotiations with others concerning buying, receiving, using, selling and delivering U.S.-origin aircraft which went to the Export Administration Regulations.
"Today's case should serve as further warning of Iran's continued efforts to circumvent sanctions and obtain U.S. technology. Together with our colleagues from the Justice and Commerce departments, OFAC will continue to aggressively pursue both domestic and foreign entities that seek to violate U.S. sanctions programs by exporting goods to Iran from the United States." said Adam J. Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Chemical Engineer Sentenced To 4 Years Imprisonment for Violating Iran Sanctions
01/13/10 11:09 PM
On
January 12, 2010, Philadelphia Daily News
reported that Ali
Amirnazmi (Amirnazmi), a chemical engineer that
had a dual U.S. and Iranian citizenship, was
sentenced to four years in federal prison for
violating Iran sanctions.
According to the prosecution, Amirnazmi, who owned TranTech Consultants, an Exton, PA company that specialized in databases for chemical companies, conspired and from 1996 to July 2008 transferred a chemical-procurement software system he developed, ChemPlan, to Iran to train Iranians to close technological gaps between Iran and its adversaries.
Amirnazmi also “worked with and at the express direction of” Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to support Iran’s petrochemical industry. Amirnazmi entered into contracts with Iranian officials creating partnerships that would obtain large quantities of chemicals to be used in large chemical manufacturing plants in Iran. Some of the chemicals had serious dual-use potential, including use in the manufacture of solid-phase rocket propellants.
At his sentencing hearing, Amirnazmi was defiant and maintained that he never intended to break any U.S. laws and stated he had no reason to lie.
In addition to four-year sentence, the U.S. District Judge ordered Amirnazmi to serve five years of supervised release once he leaves prison, make restitution of $17,227 to a bank he defrauded and forfeit $81,277.
According to the prosecution, Amirnazmi, who owned TranTech Consultants, an Exton, PA company that specialized in databases for chemical companies, conspired and from 1996 to July 2008 transferred a chemical-procurement software system he developed, ChemPlan, to Iran to train Iranians to close technological gaps between Iran and its adversaries.
Amirnazmi also “worked with and at the express direction of” Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to support Iran’s petrochemical industry. Amirnazmi entered into contracts with Iranian officials creating partnerships that would obtain large quantities of chemicals to be used in large chemical manufacturing plants in Iran. Some of the chemicals had serious dual-use potential, including use in the manufacture of solid-phase rocket propellants.
At his sentencing hearing, Amirnazmi was defiant and maintained that he never intended to break any U.S. laws and stated he had no reason to lie.
In addition to four-year sentence, the U.S. District Judge ordered Amirnazmi to serve five years of supervised release once he leaves prison, make restitution of $17,227 to a bank he defrauded and forfeit $81,277.
IEEPA Charges Filed Against an Iranian Man and Company
03/17/09 05:21 PM
On
March 16, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
issued
a press release stating that Ali
Khoshnevisrad (Khoshnevisrad) was arrested on March
14, 2009, after he arrived in San Francisco
International Airport on a flight from abroad. On
March 16, 2009, Khoshnevisrad, a citizen of Iran,
and his Iranian company Ariasa, AG (Ariasa) were
charged with purchasing helicopter engines and
advanced aerial cameras for fighter bombers from
U.S. firms and illegally exporting them to Iran
using companies in Ireland, Malaysia and the
Netherlands. One of the alleged recipients of the
U.S. goods was an Iranian military firm that has
since been designated by the U.S. as owned or
controlled by entities involved in Iran’s nuclear
and ballistic missile program.
Khoshnevisrad and his company Ariasa are each charged with two counts of unlawful export of U.S. goods to Iran and two counts of conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods to Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR).
According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint filed in August 2008, Khoshnevisrad and Ariasa instructed a trading company in Ireland to purchase several model 250 turbo-shaft helicopter engines from Rolls-Royce Corp in Indiana. This type of engine was originally designed for a U.S. Army light observation helicopter and is now installed in civil and military helicopters. The Irish trading company purchased 17 of the engines for a total of $4.27 million, falsely stating that the helicopters would be used by the Irish company or by fake companies. The affidavit alleges that these helicopter engines were exported from the U.S. to a company in Malaysia pretending to be a book publisher, at a freight forwarding company address. From there, the engines were shipped to Iran. Among the recipients was the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company, known by its Iranian acronym as HESA. In September 2008, HESA was designated by the Treasury Department as an Iranian proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.
The affidavit further alleges that Khoshnevisrad and Ariasa instructed in 2006 a Dutch aviation parts company to place an order for several aerial panorama cameras from the U.S. The specific cameras were designed for the U.S. Air Force, for use on bombers, fighters and surveillance aircraft. The Dutch company was supposed to place the order with a Pennsylvania company and to ship them to an address in Iran. Khoshnevisrad, knowing that Iranian end user would be prohibited in this case, instructed the Dutch company to “give them an end user by yourself.” In August 2006, a representative of the Dutch company notified Khoshnevisrad that the cameras were received and would soon be shipped to Tehran.
The affidavit alleges that neither Khoshnevisrad nor Ariasa ever sought an authorization or a license from the U.S. Department of Treasure to export any goods or technology to Iran. If convicted, Khoshnevisrad faces a prison sentence of up to 20 years for each of the first three counts of the complaint, and a prison sentence of up to five years on the fourth count.
Khoshnevisrad and his company Ariasa are each charged with two counts of unlawful export of U.S. goods to Iran and two counts of conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods to Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR).
According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint filed in August 2008, Khoshnevisrad and Ariasa instructed a trading company in Ireland to purchase several model 250 turbo-shaft helicopter engines from Rolls-Royce Corp in Indiana. This type of engine was originally designed for a U.S. Army light observation helicopter and is now installed in civil and military helicopters. The Irish trading company purchased 17 of the engines for a total of $4.27 million, falsely stating that the helicopters would be used by the Irish company or by fake companies. The affidavit alleges that these helicopter engines were exported from the U.S. to a company in Malaysia pretending to be a book publisher, at a freight forwarding company address. From there, the engines were shipped to Iran. Among the recipients was the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company, known by its Iranian acronym as HESA. In September 2008, HESA was designated by the Treasury Department as an Iranian proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.
The affidavit further alleges that Khoshnevisrad and Ariasa instructed in 2006 a Dutch aviation parts company to place an order for several aerial panorama cameras from the U.S. The specific cameras were designed for the U.S. Air Force, for use on bombers, fighters and surveillance aircraft. The Dutch company was supposed to place the order with a Pennsylvania company and to ship them to an address in Iran. Khoshnevisrad, knowing that Iranian end user would be prohibited in this case, instructed the Dutch company to “give them an end user by yourself.” In August 2006, a representative of the Dutch company notified Khoshnevisrad that the cameras were received and would soon be shipped to Tehran.
The affidavit alleges that neither Khoshnevisrad nor Ariasa ever sought an authorization or a license from the U.S. Department of Treasure to export any goods or technology to Iran. If convicted, Khoshnevisrad faces a prison sentence of up to 20 years for each of the first three counts of the complaint, and a prison sentence of up to five years on the fourth count.
Director of Singapore Firm Pleads Guilty to Illegal Exporting to Iran
03/15/09 05:25 PM
The
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued
a press release announcing that
Laura Wang-Woodford (Wang-Woodford), a U.S. citizen
and a director of Monarch Aviation Pte, Ltd.
(Monarch), pled guilty on March 13, 2009 to
conspiring to violate the U.S. trade embargo by
exporting controlled aircraft components to Iran.
Monarch is a Singapore company that traded in military and commercial aircraft parts for over 20 years. Wang-Woodford was arrested in December 2007, at San Francisco International Airport after arriving from Hong Kong, and has been incarcerated since then. Both Wang-Woodford and her husband Brian D. Woodford, a U.K. citizen who served as chairman and managing director of Monarch, were originally charged in a 20-count indictment returned in the Eastern District of New York in January 2003. While Brian D. Woodford is a fugitive, a superseding indictment charging Wang-Woodford with operating Jungda International Pte. Ltd (Jungda), a Singapore successor to Monarch, was returned on May 22, 2008.
The current indictment against the Woodfords alleges that between January 1998 and December 2007 defendants exported controlled U.S. aircraft parts from the U.S. to Monarch and Jungda in Singapore and Malaysia and then re-exported those parts to Tehran without obtaining the required U.S. government licenses. The aircraft parts included aircraft shields, shears, switch assemblies, and “o” rings. The defendants falsely listed Monarch and Jungda as the ultimate recipients of the parts on the U.S. export documents. The current indictment also charges that the defendants arranged for the illegal export of U.S. military aircraft equipment to Monarch, to be used in Chinook military helicopters.
When Wang-Woodford was arrested in San Francisco, she had the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) catalogues with her, which contained advertisements for military technology and weaponry. CPMIEC has been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) for their sales of military hardware to Iran. Engaging in business with CPMIEC is prohibited for all U.S. persons.
Wang-Woodford faces a prison sentence of up to five years and a fine of up to $250,000. She also agreed to forfeit $500,000 to the U. S. Treasury Department.
Monarch is a Singapore company that traded in military and commercial aircraft parts for over 20 years. Wang-Woodford was arrested in December 2007, at San Francisco International Airport after arriving from Hong Kong, and has been incarcerated since then. Both Wang-Woodford and her husband Brian D. Woodford, a U.K. citizen who served as chairman and managing director of Monarch, were originally charged in a 20-count indictment returned in the Eastern District of New York in January 2003. While Brian D. Woodford is a fugitive, a superseding indictment charging Wang-Woodford with operating Jungda International Pte. Ltd (Jungda), a Singapore successor to Monarch, was returned on May 22, 2008.
The current indictment against the Woodfords alleges that between January 1998 and December 2007 defendants exported controlled U.S. aircraft parts from the U.S. to Monarch and Jungda in Singapore and Malaysia and then re-exported those parts to Tehran without obtaining the required U.S. government licenses. The aircraft parts included aircraft shields, shears, switch assemblies, and “o” rings. The defendants falsely listed Monarch and Jungda as the ultimate recipients of the parts on the U.S. export documents. The current indictment also charges that the defendants arranged for the illegal export of U.S. military aircraft equipment to Monarch, to be used in Chinook military helicopters.
When Wang-Woodford was arrested in San Francisco, she had the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) catalogues with her, which contained advertisements for military technology and weaponry. CPMIEC has been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) for their sales of military hardware to Iran. Engaging in business with CPMIEC is prohibited for all U.S. persons.
Wang-Woodford faces a prison sentence of up to five years and a fine of up to $250,000. She also agreed to forfeit $500,000 to the U. S. Treasury Department.