CBP and EU Commission Adopt a Joint Roadmap Towards Mutual Recognition of Trade Partnership Programs
03/28/08 12:31 PM
On March 27, 2008, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection announced the adoption of the U.S.-EU Joint
Customs Cooperation Committee (JCCC) Roadmap towards Mutual
Recognition of Trade Partnership Programs. Mutual Recognition of
the U.S.'s Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and
the EU's Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) supply chain security
programs would allow companies to receive benefits similar to those
conferred on companies participating in the other country's
program.
The Roadmap outlines six areas that the U.S. and the EU will address to achieve the goal of implementing Mutual Recognition: political, administrative, legal, policy, technical/operational, and evaluation. The Roadmap sets forth key benchmarks for measuring progress in each area.
The U.S. and EU began working towards implementing Mutual Recognition of C-TPAT and AEO in 2007. The initial steps consisted of completing an in-depth comparison of both the U.S. and EU programs and conducting a pilot program in which CBP observed security components of the EU's AEO audit process. The Roadmap was drafted and endorsed based on the conclusions drawn from the initial U.S.-EU effort.
CBP states that, "Throughout the upcoming year, the U.S. and EU will:
The Roadmap outlines six areas that the U.S. and the EU will address to achieve the goal of implementing Mutual Recognition: political, administrative, legal, policy, technical/operational, and evaluation. The Roadmap sets forth key benchmarks for measuring progress in each area.
The U.S. and EU began working towards implementing Mutual Recognition of C-TPAT and AEO in 2007. The initial steps consisted of completing an in-depth comparison of both the U.S. and EU programs and conducting a pilot program in which CBP observed security components of the EU's AEO audit process. The Roadmap was drafted and endorsed based on the conclusions drawn from the initial U.S.-EU effort.
CBP states that, "Throughout the upcoming year, the U.S. and EU will:
- Establish guidelines regarding information exchanges, including the exchange of validation/audit results and legalities associated with the disclosure of membership details
- Perform joint verifications to determine remaining gaps between AEO/C-TPAT and resolve any discrepancies
- Explore and test an export component for C-TPAT
- Exchange best practices through joint visits and conferences
- Continue dialogue on legal and policy developments under the respective administrations
- Endorse and sign a Mutual Recognition Arrangement
- Evaluate Mutual Recognition benefits for AEO/C-TPAT members
China and U.S. Launch Trade Security Pilot Program
03/25/08 10:01 AM
On
March 24, 2008, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
announced the
start of a validation pilot program in China made possible by
cooperation between CBP and the General Administration of China
Customs. The pilot program involved three Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) importer partners whose supply chains
predominately originate in China.
CBP states that the U.S. companies were invited to participate based upon several factors including volume, product type, and location of their supply chains in China. The companies voluntarily agreed to participate in the pilot program with the concurrence of both administrations.
China Customs led the validations based on C-TPAT minimum security criteria as a guide and with CBP supply chain specialists providing technical assistance. Prior to the validations, the companies were receiving minimal C-TPAT benefits due to CBP's inability to validate their security procedures in China. However, the information gathered during the validation will now allow CBP the ability to assess whether greater C-TPAT benefits are warranted. Both CBP and China Customs will evaluate the success of the pilot program and determine next steps.
C-TPAT Director Brad Skinner stated, "It took several months of intense discussions to get to this point and we look forward to continuing this effort as we explore future cooperation. It is a win-win for all. CBP and China Customs have the knowledge that all parties involved have good security practices in place and the companies can benefit by receiving fewer exams."
CBP states that the U.S. companies were invited to participate based upon several factors including volume, product type, and location of their supply chains in China. The companies voluntarily agreed to participate in the pilot program with the concurrence of both administrations.
China Customs led the validations based on C-TPAT minimum security criteria as a guide and with CBP supply chain specialists providing technical assistance. Prior to the validations, the companies were receiving minimal C-TPAT benefits due to CBP's inability to validate their security procedures in China. However, the information gathered during the validation will now allow CBP the ability to assess whether greater C-TPAT benefits are warranted. Both CBP and China Customs will evaluate the success of the pilot program and determine next steps.
C-TPAT Director Brad Skinner stated, "It took several months of intense discussions to get to this point and we look forward to continuing this effort as we explore future cooperation. It is a win-win for all. CBP and China Customs have the knowledge that all parties involved have good security practices in place and the companies can benefit by receiving fewer exams."
GAO Issues Report on Supply Chain Security Calling for More and Better Data on CSI
01/26/08 10:02 PM
On January 25, 2008, the U.S.
Government Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report entitled, "Supply
Chain Security: Examinations of
High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved
Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed." A summary of
the report can be found here and a GAO's highlights
document can be found here.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to examine cargo it deems to be high risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. GAO issued reports on CSI in 2003 and 2005 finding that CSI helped enhance homeland security and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates the information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations.
GAO recommends that CBP enhance data collected on CSI team performance, host government examinations, and related performance measures. CBP concurred with the recommendation to enhance data team performance and partially concurred with the need to enhance data on host examinations, stating that it already conducts actions to improve such data. However, GAO states that these actions do not systematically collect data on people, processes, or technology used by host-governments to examine U.S.-bound containers. CBP partially concurred with the need to enhance performance measures, but stated it already captures core program functions. GAO still sees room for improvement.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to examine cargo it deems to be high risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. GAO issued reports on CSI in 2003 and 2005 finding that CSI helped enhance homeland security and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates the information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations.
GAO recommends that CBP enhance data collected on CSI team performance, host government examinations, and related performance measures. CBP concurred with the recommendation to enhance data team performance and partially concurred with the need to enhance data on host examinations, stating that it already conducts actions to improve such data. However, GAO states that these actions do not systematically collect data on people, processes, or technology used by host-governments to examine U.S.-bound containers. CBP partially concurred with the need to enhance performance measures, but stated it already captures core program functions. GAO still sees room for improvement.
CBP Announces Singapore to Scan U.S.-Bound Cargo as Part of Secure Freight Initiative
12/17/07 10:42 PM
Singapore - The United States and Singapore today arranged to cooperate on the Secure Freight Initiative, a joint effort of the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration and the U.S. Department of State aimed at keeping radioactive weapons out of U.S.-bound cargo.
Singapore is a key location for this scanning. Among worldwide seaports processing containers with goods destined for the U.S., Singapore is first world-wide in terms of volume of transshipments, and sixth in terms of the volume of shipments and containers imported. In fiscal year 2006, for example, the country processed more than 375,000 shipments bound for the U.S., constituting approximately 3.68 percent of all shipments here.
Singapore will initially participate in the Secure Freight Initiative in a limited capacity. However, even this limited participation goes beyond the mandate of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) of 2006. That law required that the U.S. evaluate, at three initial ports, the possibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo for radiation.
The port of Singapore is part of the second group of international ports evaluating integrated cargo radiation detection and non-intrusive imaging capabilities in Phase 1 of the Secure Freight Initiative. Fully operational testing of Secure Freight Initiative equipment began October 12, 2007 at Port Qasim, Pakistan; Puerto Cortés, Honduras; and at the Port of Southampton, United Kingdom.
The second group of ports will provide radiation detection and imaging capabilities on a limited capacity basis that exceeds the requirements of the SAFE Port Act. In addition to Singapore, these facilities include: Hong Kong's Modern terminal; the Gamman terminal at Busan, Korea; and Oman's Port Salalah. These facilities were chosen to help determine the impact of radiation scanning at large volume ports, as well as at ports where a large number of transshipments are processed. Phase 1 results will provide guidance on future port expansion.
At Singapore, as at other ports, data from Secure Freight Initiative scanning and imaging equipment will be provided in near-real time to CBP officials on-site, as well as to officials at the National Targeting Center in the United States for analysis and automatic integration with U.S. systems.
In March 2003, the port of Singapore was designated a Container Security Initiative port. For more than four years, CSI officers have used manifest examinations and other information to determine whether x-ray and radiation detection equipment should be used to examine U.S.-bound cargo. The Port of Singapore began participating in Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Megaports Initiative in spring, 2004. The Secure Freight Initiative expands the use of radiation scanning and imaging equipment to examine more U.S.-bound containers, not just those determined to be high-risk.