State Amends ITAR to Include Eritrea on Prohibited Exports List

On October 6, 2008, the U.S. Department of State published a final rule amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) with respect to Eritrea. The U.S. Department of State has added Eritrea to its regulations on prohibited exports and sales to certain countries as a result of Eritrea’s designation as country not cooperating fully with antiterrorism efforts.

This rule is effective October 3, 2008.

North Korea to Remain on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List

On August 25, 2008, after the U.S. refused to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, North Korea announced it has stopped disabling its nuclear reactor complex and will consider rebuilding.


The statement comes two months after North Korea released the report of its plutonium programs and detonated the reactor’s cooling tower, reports the Washington Post. These actions prompted statements by the Bush administration that the U.S. will remove North Korea from the State Terrorism List and will lift some trade sanctions.

However, on August 11, 2008, the United States refused to remove North Korea from the list, citing slow progress and refusal to permit outside experts to verify the scope of the nuclear program.

The work to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor complex stopped on August 14, 2008, according to a statement issued by North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The official Korean Central News Agency added that the country will consider rebuilding the nuclear plant to its original state. U.S. officials note, however, that the plant has been substantially dismantled under the supervision of outside nuclear technicians and it would take at least a year to restore it to its operation.

North Korea entered into agreement with the U.S. in 2007 to abandon its nuclear program. North Korea promised to start by disabling the Yongbyon plant and detailing the scope of its nuclear program. In return, the U.S. promised aid and removal from the terrorism list. Removal from the list would mean lifting of the associated sanctions.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has published Q &A for exporters on the Rescission of North Korea from the State Sponsor of Terrorism List, which can be found here. The Q&A also details general export to North Korea licensing requirements.

State Department Limits ITAR Registration to 1 Year

On July 18, 2008, the U.S. Department of State published a final rule in the Federal Register which amends the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The final rule is effective on July 18, 2008 and revises the validity period for registration to one year (from up to 2 years) and limits the time frame in which a registration may be renewed. A registrant must now submit its request for renewal of its registration at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the registration, but no earlier than 60 days prior to the expiration date.

The amended regulation follows:

Sec. 122.3 Registration fees.



(a) A person who is required to register may do so for a period of 1 year upon submission of a completed Form DS-2032, transmittal letter and payment of $1,750.



(b) Expiration of registration. A registrant must submit its request for registration renewal at least 30 days but no earlier than 60 days prior to the expiration date.

State/DDTC Updates Guidance Documents

On July 1 - 3, 2008, the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) updated its website with new guidance documents. Specifically, the DDTC posted updated Agreements Guidelines on July 1, 2008; a listing of countries by DoS regional bureaus, licensing review checklists, and updated licensing FAQs on July 2, 2008; and updated its DDTC Outreach page on July 3, 2008.

President Changes North Korea's Designations

On June 26, 2008, President Bush announced the lifting of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), and notified Congress of his intent to rescind North Korea's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), which triggers a 45-day congressional notification period prior to formal rescission of the designation. The Executive Order can be found here and the State Department's press release can be found here.

This presidential action was taken following North Korea's submission of a declaration of its nuclear programs, which will now be subject to verification, by the Six Parties. The Six Party talks has been a series of meetings with six party states: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), North Korea, the United States, the Russian Federation, and Japan, which were the result of North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003.

The Administration plans to carry out North Korea's rescission from the SST list only after the Six Parties reach agreement on acceptable verification principles and acceptable verification protocol regarding North Korea's nuclear activities; the Six Parties have established an acceptable monitoring mechanism; and verification activities have begun.

State Department Website Updates

On April 28, 2008 and April 22, 2008, the State Department published several updates to its website.

On April 28, 2008, the following updates were published:

On April 22, 2008, the following updates were published:

GAO Issues Report Critical of State and Commerce's Export Control Functions

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report entitled, "Export Controls: State and Commerce Have Not Taken Basic Steps to Better Ensure U.S. Interests Are Protected" on April 24, 2008. A summary can be found here and highlights here.

In the report, the GAO found export licensing inefficiencies, poor interagency cooperation, and limits in the Departments of State's and Commerce's ability to provide a sound basis for changes to the system. In November 2007, the GAO reported that procedural and automation weaknesses, along with workforce challenges, created inefficiencies in State's arms export licensing process. The GAO noted that in less than 4 years, median processing times for license applications nearly doubled (from 14 days in 2003 to 26 days in 2006), with State's backlog of open cases peaking at 10,000.

Specifically, the GAO found procedural weaknesses in that the State Department lacked screening procedures to promptly identify those cases needing interagency review. The GAO also found that State also lacked procedures to expedite certain cases such as exports to the UK and Australia and those to support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, as required by law. The GAO also found electronic processing problems with State's D-Trade system and that State has faced challenges in establishing and retaining a sufficient workforce with the experience and skills needed to efficiently and effectively process arms export applications.

In response to these findings, State has informed the GAO that it (1) has implemented procedures to more quickly determine whether referrals to other agencies are needed and instituted senior level reviews of cases that are over 60 days old, (2) is planning future D-Trade upgrades that are expected to facilitate case reviews by licensing officers and allow managers to better oversee the processes, and (3) has restructured its licensing divisions to ensure a more equitable distribution in the workload and skill level of licensing officers based on the GAO's analysis.

From 1998 through 2005, the GAO found that Commerce's overall median processing times have remained stable at around 40 days and are consistent with time frames established by a 1995 executive order. However, the GAO found that Commerce lacks efficiency-related measures and analyses that would allow it to identify opportunities for improvement. For example, Commerce only measures its performance in terms of how long it takes to refer an application to another agency for review but does not have efficiency-related measures for other steps in its review process, such as how quickly a license should be issued once other agencies provide their input, or for the entire process.

The GAO also found vulnerabilities in the export control system due to poor interagency coordination. The GAO noted issues relating to jurisdiction determinations between State and Commerce and license exemption determinations between State and Defense. In addition, the GAO found that State and Commerce do not receive information on criminal export control prosecution outcomes on a timely basis.

Finally, the GAO found that the absence of systematic assessments by State and Commerce limits their ability to identify problems and make improvements to the system.

The GAO concluded its report by stating that, "While the implementation of our recommendations is an important first step for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the export control system, a sustained commitment on the part of the departments to engage in a continuous process of evaluation, analysis, and coordination is needed."

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